Another Hawkeye Hector scoop, of course! What would we do without him?

The Guardian's position on the ELAS scandal and running sore seems more than a bit equivocal, when you consider Patrick Collinson's hostile approach to ELAS victims in contrast to Rupert Jones's. And in response to eltello's 84820, it's interesting to note that this isn't the first time Chris Wiscarson has worked at ELAS; his first stint there began in the fatefully crisis laden year 1973, the bringing of free reserves onto the books to support performance in the 1973-6 triennium and with it the start of the ELAS Estate giveaway. He'd have known Sherlock and Roy Ranson, a.k.a. The Pope, but not Chris Headdon at that stage, who didn't join ELAS till 1978. So yes, it would be very interesting to hear his reprise of that first period given everything else which has followed.

But still Rupert's implicit question remains: Just how many whiffy fish are there in the ELAS barrel and Establishment cover-up? At the risk of repeating some items in an earlier Equitable Life Support post, Eeyore would like to list his real stinkers for the record:

1) After the disastrous 1973-6 triennium, why did Sherlock persist on the same course, which set ELAS against everything it had previously advocated and stood for?
2) When all the free reserves had been given away around 1982, why wasn't the potential necessity and significance of the GAR DTBP senior management reserve policy then not properly discussed,recorded and carried forward?
3)Why was that DTBP eventually used and got through as an ELAS Board footnote in 1993/4, and mentioned only en passant to Rathbone of GAD? Was it because it was inherently in bad faith, and hence something implicitly to be ashamed of?
5)At the end of the RAP era in 1987, why were the interests of the Society's existing policyholders, contacts and clientel so deliberately placed above the equity and interests of newcomers?
6) How on earth did Sherlock become the first Head of CoB regulator LAUTRO in 1988 while he was Actuary and General Manager of ELAS? Wasn't this of far greater import than Ranson's dual role later on?
7) With Sherlock newly established as Head of LAUTRO, how could the CoB and good faith aspects of the two presentations, discussions and publication of "With Profits Without Mystery" ever lead to anything fruitful or meaningful?
9) Why were IA President Marshall Field's 1987 and GAD's George Newton's 1989 caveats on the general situation then pertaining persistently ignored? Given the relevance of George Newton's memorandum, that's simply inexplicable.
10) It all adds up to a pivotally catastrophic failure of both prudential and CoB regulation over the years 1987-90, much of which was technically within the PO's reference period.
11) So why does almost none of this inform the PO's findings of maladministration, and why does it/how can it fall outside the period for which she upheld the General Complaint?
12) Why is it that, despite the fact that we now know it exists, has ELAS electronic data for this period never been carried forward or read into the modern record?
13) After Sherlock and LAUTRO were replaced by the PIA, and the way was practically open for the conduct of business aspects of ELAS's business to be investigated, so why did the prudential regulator then block it, and subvert both the PIA mis-selling report and Warren Opinion?
14) Why wasn't this maladministration in PO2?
15) How could it be that the regulators abrogated all responsibility for the 2000 bonus reductions and 2001 cuts, and only requested that ELAS restore itself to a sound financial position AFTER they had been made?
16) Why on earth did the prudential regulator or Chris Headdon not require retraction of the Nash Feb 2000 letter, the stated financial consequences of which required the DTBP to be declared lawful, when GAD had previously told Headdon that he couldn't assume this in preparing the Society's returns? The prudentential regulators were by then intimately aware that the consequences of losing Hymnan were well in excess of £50 million.
17) Why wasn't procrastination and evasion by the FSA as to the pre-Con-Promise value of the reinsurance treaty classed as maladministration?
18) Why was the Con allowed by the prudential regulators when in essence they knew that there were WPA and FSAVC cuts yet to come, and that the lack of free reserves meant the end of the Society's with-profits status?
19) Why did PO2 adopt economical methods of ruling such that all GAR DTBP matters were made subordinate to later reinsurance treaty matters, and was it co-incidental that this led to no Francovich serious EU Life Directives breaches being determined other than the one which EQUI ahd previously made?
20) Why wasn't the PO's draft actuarial review officially finalised and published? Eeyore drew Chad's attention to it, and hoped that he might obtain permission to see, for example paras 19.47 et seq. Chad's correspondence shows that EMAG also sent him a copy, which the PO did not sanction him to read.
21) How came it that on the one hand the PO's Chronology shows how the FSA got the Financial Ombudsman to take its line on the Con, and later refuse all "Penrose-related" complaints, and on the other The Treasury allowed Chad to use Penrose for his own contrary purposes? How could both the Treasury and Chad themselves make unwarranted CoB assertions to suit their own purposes?
22) All these matters clearly demonstrate that there were serious CoB irregularities (in essence sustained selective partial disclosure and consistent misrepresentation over many years), and that they impinged on the Society's financial strength and solvency. So how can the absence of any CoB investigation and deliberate ignorance of everything the CoB regulator did at the prudential/CoB interface possibly be justified?
23) This calls into question the role of Sir Howard Davies as Head Designate of the new FSA and his transitionary headship of the PIA as CoB regulator.
24) In parallel and similarly, accountancy firm Bacon Woodrow Deloitte's conduct and conflicts of interests need further explanation. They sold the Society's overseas policies for them in Guernsey, privately warned off their own clients like Fortresident, supplied actuary Peter Nowell, and endorsed the Con/FOS line on the Society's financial position and FOS compensation.
25) If Sir Howard Davies and John Tiner can quit the FSA and join vulture capitalists Paternoster and Resolution, while Adair Turner quits Paternoster to head the FSA, doesn't the prevailing regulatory milieu and culture need investigation and reform?
26) During discussions with Sir John's team Eeyore was told by an actuary that it was now widely accepted that free funds in the shape of an inherited and separate policyholder estate were essential for the proper function of with profits and insurance business. So why was permission not granted for this to be included in the published minutes, and why has the actuarial profession as a whole remained officially silent on the matter?
27) The Guernsey Financial Services Commission formally asked Sir John Chadwick if he would ensure that Guernsey policyholders were accorded the same rights as other international policyholders under EU and UK law. So how come that has been watered down into Sir John stating that all overseas and international policyholders will be treated in the same way as UK ones? An EU/international shut out bid or what?
28) If this is the context in which the pre-87 policyholders could round trip and later top up their policies without restriction, or in which scheme members or the FSA's own FSAVC members could be got out with reduced penalties, what does that say about or financial milieu and governance as a whole?
29) Despite due warning and a position on the subject having been reserved, how could Vanni Treves, Charles Thomson, Sir Callum McCarthy of the FSA, Nick Prettejohn of the Pru and the Watson Wyatt Independent Actuary all allow the WPAs to be transferred to the Pru with loss of their original rights and expectations, plus a whole load of extra charges thrown in? In a nutshell, they were cast off and shafted.
30)Given all this, how can the Coalition even consider reneging on its pre-election promises?

Eeyores piscatorially.